El libro de María González Navarro se presenta a sí mismo como una “nueva hermenéutica” (23). La novedad involucra dos aspectos: uno que llamaremos metateórico y otro hermenéutico en propiedad. Hablando metateóricamente, el libro presenta una hermenéutica gadameriana vigorizada y robustecida por las teorías pragma-dialécticas de la argumentación. Desde el punto de vista hermenéutico propiamente dicho, la novedad reposa en que se considera que la interpretación correcta está indesligablemente vinculada a la argumentación abductiva.

Este trabajo examina parte del pensamiento de Kant de cara a precisar en qué sentido puede pensarse la universalidad como una exigencia para la filosofía moral y cómo las investigaciones de ese autor pueden contribuir a esclarecer esta cuestión. El análisis de los argumentos muestra algunas inconsistencias lógicas en el desarrollo del problema de la universalización moral que los especialistas han tratado de explicar, a partir de las cuales sugerimos que una alternativa de análisis gramatical al estilo de Wittgenstein puede (...) ayudar a clarificar. El trabajo es, pues, crítico y pro positivo y conlleva una interpretación programática de tesis kantianas. (shrink)

Se busca rastrear la imagen que Platón tiene de Heráclito y articularla con la estructura argumentativa del Cratilo, para comprender las necesidades textuales a las que responde la doctrina del flujo perpetuo, es decir, la discusión sobre la corrección (ὀρθότης) del nombre. Gracias a la inclusión del testimonio heraclíteo, resulta posible rastrear la presunta consolidación de la tesis sobre los nombres primarios y los secundarios como el eje de la separación entre dos planos de realidad (uno estable y uno móvil) (...) y de la teoría de las Ideas -es decir, como la base de la epistemología platónica presente en los diálogos de madurez-. The article seeks to trace the image Plato has of Heraclitus and connect it with the argumentative structure of the Cratylus in order to understand the textual needs that give rise to the doctrine of perpetual flux, that is, the discussion regarding the correctness (ὀρθότης) of names. The inclusion of Heraclitus's testimony makes it possible to trace the alleged consolidation of the thesis regarding primary and secondary names as the axis of separation between two levels of reality (one stable, the other, changing) and the theory of Ideas -that is, as the basis of Plato's epistemology as set forth in the late dialogues-. (shrink)

IntroductionRheumatologists are the primary healthcare professionals responsible for patients with rheumatic diseases and should acquire medical ethical competencies, such as the informed consent process. The objective clinical structured examination is a valuable tool for assessing clinical competencies. We report the performance of 90 rheumatologist trainees participating in a station designed to evaluate the ICP during the 2018 and 2019 national accreditations.MethodsThe station was validated and represented a medical encounter in which the rheumatologist informed a patient with systemic lupus erythematosus with (...) clinically active nephritis about renal biopsy. A trained patient–actor and an evaluator were instructed to assess ICP skills in obtaining formal informed consent, delivering bad news and overall communication with patients. The evaluator used a tailored checklist and form.ResultsCandidate performance varied with ICP content and was superior for potential benefit information but significantly reduced for potential complications and biopsy description. Only 17.8% of the candidates mentioned the legal perspective of ICP. Death was omitted by the majority of the candidates ; after the patient–actor challenged candidates, only 57.1% of them gave a clear and positive answer. Evaluators frequently rated candidate communications skills as superior, but ≥1 negative aspect was identified in 69% of the candidates.ConclusionsEthical competencies are mandatory for professional rheumatologists. It seems necessary to include an ethics competency framework in the curriculum throughout the rheumatology residency. (shrink)

En lo que sigue esbozo tres posibles vías de desarrollo de la propuesta de Pérez y Gomila sobre la perspectiva de la segunda persona de la atribución mental que, en su conjunto, dejan ver la importancia de caracterizar finamente las relaciones entre lo mental y lo normativo en la perspectiva de la segunda persona. Las tres vías que propongo parten, aunque van más allá, de algunos hallazgos de la teoría de la pragmática afectiva. Me centraré en los casos de (...) interacción en segunda persona más que en las atribuciones en segunda persona y adoptaré como caso paradigmático la relación que se establece entre un bebé y su cuidadora. (shrink)

This work was my theses to get the MA in Philosophy. Their focus is the ethics implied in digital culture and networked society. Themes are Ethics, culture, technology, political control, autonomous systems.

L’impasse dans laquelle se trouve aujourd’hui le Venezuela ne peut être abordée sans une prise en compte préalable du chemin démocratique que le pays a parcouru jusqu’à la situation qu’il connaît de nos jours. Cette situation est l’expression d’une division radicale de la population en deux parties, « chavistas » et « anti-chavistas »1. En effet, comment expliquer ce paradoxe..

This paper criticizes genetic naturalism, namely, the task of explaining how reason emerges from nature. We take into account Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism and his analogy of triangulation. Our aim is to criticize both the metaphysical suppositions of anomalous monism and its consequences for genetic naturalism. We propose that those suppositions and those consequences prevent the genetic question to be appropriately raised and, therefore, mislead the research for a reasonable answer to that.

BackgroundMonitoring recovery–stress balance in sport is becoming more relevant to prevent training maladaptation and reach the optimal performance for each athlete. The use of questionnaires that identify the athlete’s recovery–stress state have much acceptance in sports due to reliability and useful, furthermore for its low cost. Identifying possible differences between sport modalities and sex is important to determine specific needs and possible intervention ways to keep a recovery–stress balance. The aim was to analyze the differences in the recovery–stress state and (...) mood states by sex and sport type during the competitive phase in young Mexican athletes. As a secondary objective, the psychometric properties of the Mexican version of the Recovery–Stress Questionnaire for Athletes were analyzed.MethodsA cross-sectional study was carried on with 461 athletes, 17.95 years old, from six sports disciplines. The RESTQ-Sport and Profile of Mood States were applied in a single moment. Differences by sex and sports modality were analyzed. RESTQ-Sport’s confirmatory factor analysis was performed after the stress and recovery theoretical structure of two stress and two recovery dimensions, and last, the concurrent validation with the POMS was carried on.ResultsSignificant differences by sex were found in the General Recovery and Sport Stress dimensions of the RESTQ-Sport as well as Vigor factor of the POMS, being higher for men; furthermore, both the Sport Recovery dimension of RESTQ-Sport and Cholera and the Fatigue and Depression factors from POMS also had differences by sport type, showing a less recovery and high stress for individual sport athletes. Goodness-of-fit indexes of the model for the RESTQ-Sport were acceptable. Pearson’s correlation between questionnaires was moderate.ConclusionThe recovery–stress state shows differences in the function of sex and sport modality. More special attention is suggested for women and individual sport athletes. The higher punctuation for men compared with women in sport stress dimension did not negatively affect the recovery–stress balance for male athletes. Finally, the Mexican context adaptation of the RESTQ-Sport provides a psychometric instrument suitable to assess the recovery–stress balance in Mexican athletes. (shrink)

The emergence of the term ‘Plebanski’ as a topic trend in the scientific literature is studied as a significant communication event resulting from its use by authors to refer to the relevant aspects of Jerzy Plebanski scientific work in the area of mathematical physics. We searched the ‘Plebanski’ topic included in the titles, abstracts and key words of the papers registered in five databases: ADS/NASA, MathSciNet, SCOPUS, SPIRES and Web of Science. Our results clearly show the evolution of the JP’s (...) scientific work from a cited reference to a recognized term in the indexes of the published literature, then to a nodal concept in the scientific communication process and finally as an eponym in the Latin American scholar literature. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este trabajo discutimos tres formulaciones semánticas del condicional: la material, la estricta y la relevante. Defendemos que, desde un punto de vista formal, el condicional relevante responde mejor a nuestras intuiciones que los otros dos. Ahora bien, dado que la interpretación semántica del mismo es terreno disputado, proponemos hacerlo pragmáticamente. Dividimos el texto en tres secciones. En la primera proponemos el criterio de adecuación para evaluar distintas teorías de los condicionales: la teoría no debe dar lugar a los (...) casos más conocidos de sobregeneración inferencial. En la segunda mostramos que el condicional material y el condicional estricto sobregeneran, pues ambos admiten paradojas bien conocidas. En la última mostramos que si se interpreta pragmáticamente, el condicional relevante bloquea la aparición de las paradojas que los dos anteriores no pueden evitar, y, en esa medida responde mejor que ellos al criterio establecido y, por tanto, a nuestras intuiciones. ABSTRACT In this paper we discuss three semantic formulations of conditional: material, strict and relevant. Our aim is to show that the relevant conditional shapes our intuitions better than the other two. Since the semantic interpretation of the relevant conditional is an unsettled issue nowadays, we propose a pragmatic interpretation of it. In the first part of the paper we present the criteria to which a theory of conditionals must answer, i.e. the theory must not overgenerate. In the second one, we show that the material and the strict conditionals overgenerate because both lead to paradoxes. In the last part we show that the relevant conditional with a pragmatic interpretation solves the problem of the other conditionals. (shrink)

En su reciente libro Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction, Pérez y Gomila presentan una forma novedosa de entender nuestra capacidad de atribuir estados mentales a otras personas basada en lo que llaman interacciones en la segunda persona. Este artículo cuestiona la conceptualización y el papel explicativo que este tipo de interacciones pueden desempeñar.

Este artículo reseña: Miguel Ángel PRESNO LINERA, Derechos fundamentales e inteligencia artificial, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2022, 144 pp.

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

Political thought, from Aristotle to Lefebvre, has placed importance on the control of space as an activity of political power. Extraordinary measures taken by global policy-makers since the early 2020s as part of efforts to to combat the pandemic have included mass lock-downs, closed borders, social distancing and other forms of spatial control. Importantly, spaces dedicated to religious worship (churches, etc.) were subjected to extraordinary regulation. In the exercise of this new control of space, social control has played an important (...) role (obligation to declare one’s health condition, incitement to denounce offenders...) fostered by the authorities through various means of new social education, generating new social habits in terms of the management of space. Religious freedom and the autonomy of the Church thus faced new challenges as a result of the extraordinary control of religious space by civil power and the pressure of social control. The new forms of control incorporated into our habits deserve to be critically reviewed in our search for true spaces of freedom that are not sacrificed in the name of supposed science. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can only result from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behavior, but its stable (...) fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers’s fading qualia argument falls in it. (shrink)

This article states that research in skill acquisitionand executionhas underestimated the relevance of some features of attention. We present and theoretically discuss two essential features of attention that have been systematically overlooked in the research of skill acquisitionandexecution. First, attention alters the appearance of the perceived stimuli in an essential way; and second, attention plays a fundamental role in action, being crucial for solving the so called ’many-many problem’, that is to say, the problem of generating a coherent behavior byselecting (...) between many inputs and many potential outputs. We discuss the importance of these features for skill acquisition in sport. We also suggest empirical ways to assess the precise impact of taking them into consideration and at the same time we propose important implications for training derived from the ideas discussed in the paper. (shrink)

Many philosophers and scientists have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order Representationalist theories, attempt to explain such a self-awareness by means of a higher-order representation. Consciousness relies on our capacity to represent our own mental states, consciousness depends on our Theory of Mind. Such an ability can, at least conceptually, be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition. In this paper I will argue (...) that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories. (shrink)

In this article we aim to support the thesis that Nietzsche, from his first work The Birth of Tragedy, to his last texts, such as Twilight of the Idols, in What I owe to the ancients, proposes a radical transvaluation of the meaning of suffering human. He adopts a completely different perspective from Western metaphysical and religious conceptions, which considered suffering as an objection to life, arising from faults, failures, “sins”, which must be expiated through countless constraints, until inexorable death. (...) The nietzschean transvaluation, with its unique tragic perspective, inaugurated in The Birth of Tragedy and sustained throughout his entire work, far from considering suffering as an objection or imperfection of existence, values it and even exalts it as another modality of becoming. vital, consubstantial and inherent in every affirmation, every pleasure, every possibility of joy. (shrink)

The non-transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is non-transitive—a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness. In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter-intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to analyze the consequences that affect the First Metaphysical Principles when the Ontological Argument is established. Saint Anselm and Descartes do not share the same consideration about the first principles. My intention is to show the differences between their points of view and at the same time contrast these ideas with Polo's theory.

Resumo: Abordamos a interpretação nietzschiana sobre “liberdade” e “necessidade” e como o filósofo contesta noções da tradição, vinculadas a essa problemática: “causa e efeito”, “sujeito”, “vontade”, etc. Ele assinala como esses conceitos seriam construtos antropomórficos que não conseguem desvendar as ações geridas apenas pela dinâmica da vontade de potência. Mostramos que Nietzsche, mesmo com sua crítica aos conceitos da tradição, continua empregando noções como “fatalidade”, “necessidade”, que parecem reeditar uma conceituação antropomórfica. Indicamos como ele ultrapassa objeções passíveis de serem feitas (...) a um pensamento oscilante, que parece negar e afirmar a liberdade. Concordamos com intérpretes que destacam como seu estilo suscita deliberadamente paradoxos e aporias, já que seu objetivo, antes que estabelecer uma doutrina ou uma teoria consolidada, visa instigar novas reflexões e experiências de pensamento sobre o agir do homem.: We address nietzschiana interpretation on the issue of freedom and necessity. We show how the German philosopher disputes notions of philosophical tradition, linked to this problem, as “cause and effect”, “subject”, “i”, “will” etc. He points how these concepts would be just anthropomorphic constructs that cannot unravel the nature of the actions; managed only by the power control game of the will of power. We show that Nietzsche, even with this radical criticism of the concepts of tradition, continues to employ notions such as “fatality”, “necessity” that seem to resend to the anthropomorphic conceptualization questioned. We indicate how the author of Zaratustra manages to overcome the objections that may be made to an oscillating thought, which sometimes seems to deny and affirm freedom at different times of his work. We agree with interpreters who point out that Nietzsche’s style deliberately chooses to raise paradoxes and apparent apores, since his goal, before establishing a doctrine or a consolidated theory about freedom and necessity, is an attempt to instigate new reflections, new thought experiences, new paths of meditation on the action of man. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo comentar algunas prohibiciones del padre Miguel Ángel de Tamburini y del padre Francisco Retz explicando los conceptos fundamentales de dichas prohibiciones a través de un método analítico y relacionándolos posteriormente bajo un método sintético con los argumentos presentados. Esto último permitirá realizar una reconstrucción de las prohibiciones cuyo ensamble se consolidará en argumentos breves. Asimismo, evaluar cuáles pueden ser las causas o los fundamentos que subyacen en las prohibiciones mismas, es decir, evaluar las (...) causas de su veto. Finalmente, determinar las implicaciones filosóficas de las prohibiciones desde Descartes, Leibniz y Spinoza y sus correspondientes visiones de la Creación, la voluntad, el determinismo y el principio de individuación. (shrink)

Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the intuition is (...) misguided—at least on the reading that the conceivability arguments require—and hence that the arguments are unsupported. This, in turn, alleviates the Hard Problem but leaves us with what I think is a not easy problem. (shrink)